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I.

APPELLEES' CONTRADICTIONS OF AND DISCREPANCIES IN
THE FACTS SET FORTH IN THE RECORD ARE IRRELEVANT
FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL.
A.

Utah County Appellees.

In ruling on a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court must accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as true and
consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn from them in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff as the non-moving party. Whipple v. American Fork
Irrigation Company, 910 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1996).
Appellees, Deputy Morgan and Utah County (hereinafter "Utah County
Appellees"), misstate facts as set forth in the record. Utah County Appellees state
in their brief that "hostilities developed between the Pintars and the Houcks,
prompting Mrs. Houck to call the Sheriffs Department to complain about Mr.
Pintar's verbal and demonstrative hostilities toward them." Utah County Apllees.'
Brief p. 3. However, Appellants plead in their Complaint that there was great
hostility exhibited by the Houcks toward the Pintars, not that there were hostilities
between the parties. R. 3. This hostility included the Houcks contacting the Utah
County Sheriffs Department at least six (6) times regarding the Pintars. R. 81922, 855-56, 863-65, 1071-74, 1096-1115, 1130. Also, Utah County Appellees
state in their brief that: (1) "Deputy Morgan investigated Mrs. Houck's complaints.
. . ." and (2) "[The Pintars allege] Deputy Morgan failed to properly investigate
1

the claims before turning over her report to the Utah County Attorney(s)' Office
for prosecution." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 3, 23. The record is clear,
however, that Appellants alleged in their Complaint and argued throughout that
Deputy Morgan conducted absolutely no investigation in this matter. R. 4, 5, 818,
854, 862, 947-50, 956, 970, 980, 983, 985, 987, 992, 1135, 1292, 1294. Utah
County Appellees further state that "[T]he Pintars allege in their Complaint that
because the allegations leading to Mr. Pintar's arrest were false, Deputy Morgan's
actions were unreasonable." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 23. This is also
incorrect. Appellants alleged that the allegations leading to Mr. Pintar's arrest,
even if true, did not constitute a crime. R. 5, 829-30, 1292, 1294.
In misstating the facts, Utah County Appellees attempt to depict the situation
as a mutually hostile neighbor dispute rather than what the allegations on the
record clearly show: the only hostility in this situation was that of the Houcks
toward the Pintars. Utah County Appellees further attempt to skew the record to
portray Deputy Morgan as well-intentioned, or at worst, negligent in her duties
(e.g. "she failed to properly investigate"). In fact, Deputy Morgan willfully did not
investigate the matter. Also, Utah County Appellees misrepresent the allegations
by stating that Deputy Morgan took a complaint regarding criminal activity
committed by L. Pintar, who later turned out to be innocent.
These discrepancies are material and important in that they are factors which
tend to show concerted effort between the Houcks and Deputy Morgan to have Mr.
2

Pintar wrongfully arrested. It is somewhat understandable that reasonable officers
commit negligence from time to time in the course of an investigation. However,
it is neither reasonable nor understandable that an arrest takes place without a
crime being alleged by a complainant and absolutely no investigation by the
arresting officer. This is especially true in light of the fact that the complaining
party's close relative worked at the same law enforcement agency as the arresting
officer, and there was no crime committed, or even alleged.
Utah County Appellees' version of the allegations is irrelevant. This Court
is obliged to follow the standard set forth in Whipple, supra at 1219, and accept all
factual allegations in the Complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable
inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to Appellants as the
moving party in this matter.
B.

Houck Appellees.

Appellees Martin and Darlene Houck (hereinafter "Houck Appellees)
dispute the facts plead and attempt to introduce their version of the facts as set
forth on the record in their Statement of Facts. Houck Apllees.' Brief, pp. 1-6. For
purposes of this Appeal, this court must consider all facts in the Complaint as true
and consider them in a light most favorable to Appellants. Whether the Houcks
dispute those facts is irrelevant to this appeal.

3

II.

DEPUTY SUSAN MORGAN WAS A POLICYMAKER FOR UTAH
COUNTY IN THIS MATTER AND THEREFORE LIABILITY MUST
ATTACH TO UTAH COUNTY.
A.

The Facts Alleged in the Complaint Show that Officer Morgan is
a Policymaker for Utah County.

Utah County Appellees argue that Appellants failed to allege in their original
Complaint that Utah County has an official policy that led to a violation of Mr.
Pintar's constitutional rights and that Deputy Morgan acted pursuant to such
policy. This argument is not well taken. Appellants have plead facts in their
Complaint from which any reasonable inference therefrom shows that Deputy
Morgan herself established official Utah County policy which led to the
unconstitutional arrest of Mr. Pintar (R. 3-6; Apllnts.' Brief pp. 25-26).
Furthermore, Utah County Appellees do not dispute that: (1) a governmental
custom or policy may be established by a single policymaker, Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); (2) the identification of officials having "final
policymaking authority" is a question of state (including local) law, City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) citing Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, supra, at 483; and (3) Utah law gives law enforcement officers the final
authority to determine what is a lawful arrest. Utah Code Ann. §17-22-2; Utah
Code Ann. §77-7-2. As the Utah County Appellees correctly point out:
The fact that a particular official has discretion in the exercise of
particular functions does not give rise to municipal liability based on
4

an exercise of that discretion unless the official is also responsible,
under state law, for establishing final governmental policy respecting
such activity.

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, supra at 481-482 [emphasis added]; Utah County
Apllees.' Brief p. 3.
As the Utah County Appellees further point out: "Only those municipal officers
who have final policymaking authority may by their actions subject municipal
government to §1983 liability." City of St Louis v. Praprotnik, supra, at 123.
Utah law is clear that police officers have final decision-making authority to
make arrests. In the State of Utah, an arrest by a law enforcement officer is not the
municipality or government entity "simply going along with discretionary
decisions made by subordinates" Id. at 130. The officer's final authority to arrest
is mandated by state law. The only constraint the law of the State of Utah places
on law enforcement officers in making an arrest is that that arrest be "lawful."
Utah Code Ann. §17-22-2.

However, the State of Utah is silent as to what

constitutes a "lawful" arrest for a sheriff to make. It is therefore the duty of the
officer to determine the policy on behalf of a municipality as to what constitutes a
"lawful" arrest.
In the instant case, Utah County's policy, as established by Deputy Morgan,
was to have Mr. Pintar arrested where there was no allegation of a crime and no
investigation of the complaints made. Furthermore, Utah County's policy in this
5

matter was to ignore the fact that the complaining witness' close relative worked at
the same Sheriffs Department as Deputy Morgan—a fact that Deputy Morgan was
aware of when she responded to this matter. R. 818-19, 834, 854, 862, 929, 1018,
1294. The policy of Utah County in this matter clearly violated Mr. Pintar's
Constitutional Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable
cause. Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). Therefore, liability must attach to Utah
County.
B.

Deputy Morgan's Decision To Arrest Mr. Pintar And Initiate
Criminal Proceedings Against Him Was Not Reviewable Nor
Constrained By Any Other Policies.

Utah County Appellees concede that the law does not provide a review of a
police officer's decision to arrest prior to the arrest. Utah County Appellees argue
instead that because the law provides a review of actions after the fact, the officer's
decision is reviewable by others rendering the officer less than a final policymaker
pursuant to Milligan-Hitt v. Board of Trustees of Sheridan County School District
No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1998). This argument is flawed on two grounds:
(1) there was no review of an arrest that took place after the arrest, and even if
there were, (2) the Milligan-Hitt ruling does not consider a situation where the
review takes place after the fact. Id. at 1229-1230.
First, Utah County Appellees do not offer that there was any type of review
of Mr. Pintar's arrest. Instead, Utah County Appellees argue that because the Utah
County Attorney's Office continued with the criminal prosecution of the matter, it
6

constituted a "review" of the arrest. Utah law specifically enumerates the duties of
County Attorneys in Utah Code Ann. §17-18-1.5 and Utah Code Ann. §17-18-1.7.
There is nothing contained in these statutes or any other Utah statute which
authorizes or directs a County Attorney to make an arrest, or to review the
propriety of an arrest made by a police officer. The County Attorney's duty is to
file charges and prosecute crimes based on the allegations presented to him or her.
The County Attorney cannot "undo" an arrest after the fact. County Attorneys
have no authority to do so under Utah law.
In the instant case, if the County Attorney declined to prosecute Mr. Pintar
immediately after the arrest, the arrest would still have taken place, and Mr.
Pintar5 s constitutional rights would still have been abridged.

Following Utah

County Appellees9 logic to its natural conclusion, any police officer can arrest
anyone, with or without probable cause, for any reason (such as doing a favor for a
friend, or based on race, gender, nationality, etc.) with no liability attaching to a
municipality because the County Attorney may or may not prosecute the matter.
Similarly, a municipality could simply institute a policy of "reviews" every 10
years. If this court adopts Utah County Appellees' argument that it does not matter
when a review takes place, this would completely obviate any liability to a
municipality for the deprivation of constitutional rights incident to a wrongful
arrest.

7

Second, the facts of Milligan-Hitt, supra, present a case in which the review
of an official's decision is conducted prior to any action being taken. As set forth
Appellant's Brief, the Milligan-Hitt Court adjudicated a case in which a Wyoming
School teacher brought an action against a school district and superintendent
alleging she was not hired based on her sexual orientation. In determining whether
the superintendent was a policymaker for the school district the Court looked to the
local policy of the school district which expressly provided that the
superintendent's decisions are to be constrained by the general policies enacted by
the school board. Apllnts.' Brief, pp. 24-25. Secondly, the Court held:
. . . . under the board's policies at issue in this case, the
superintendent's hiring decisions are reviewable by others. . . . When
a superintendent puts forward the candidates recommended by the
committee, the board may decide not to hire them. If the board does
not like the candidates the superintendent puts forward, it may
demand new ones. This review prevents the superintendent from
being a final policymaker.

Id at 1229-1230.
In other words, in pursuant to the Court's ruling in Milligan-Hitt, supra, the
official's decision whether or not to hire someone is reviewable before the hiring is
made. This is distinguishable from the instant case, where, assuming arguendo
that the County Attorney(s)' prosecution constituted a review, a decision either
way occurs after the arrest has already occurred.

8

Moreover, Utah County Appellees argue that Appellants' attempt to
distinguish "decision" from "action" where no distinction is made by the MilliganHitt Court. Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 16-17. This is misconstruing the
precise fact pattern of the Milligan-Hitt case, which was: (1) decision, followed by
(2) review, followed by (3) action. In the instant case, Deputy Morgan proceeded
as follows: (1) decision, followed by (2) action, followed by (3) review (assuming
the County Attorney(s)' prosecution constituted a "review").
C,

Holding Utah County Liable In This Case Does Not Create
Municipal Liability On The Basis Of Respondeat Superior.

Lastly, Utah County Appellees argue that holding Utah County liable in the
instant case for its unconstitutional policies as set forth by Deputy Morgan would
"lead to the absurd result that all discretionary actions by police officers could be
considered the creation of municipal policy, and therefore create municipal liability
on the basis of respondeat superior." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 12-13. This
is an overbroad and vague public policy argument which could just as easily be
countered with: "Not holding Utah County liable would lead to the absurd result
that police officers could arrest anyone at any given time for no particular reason
and there would be no legal recourse for that individual."
In ruling on municipal liability regarding Section 1983 claims, the United
States Supreme Court has made it clear that the Court's duty is to determine where
the responsibility lies. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, supra, at 478-479. If an
9

official or municipal policy was the moving force behind the constitutional
deprivation, then the municipality is liable. Id.

A single individual may be a

policymaker for the entire municipality. Id. at 480. Whether a single individual is
a policymaker for the entire municipality is a question of state law. City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, supra at 124.
In the instant case, Deputy Morgan promulgated Utah County policy by
arresting Mr. Pintar in the absence of probable cause, the absence of an
investigation, and the absence of the allegation of a crime. This does not mean that
every action of every police officer would lead to municipal liability. Each case is
fact-specific.

The relevant inquiries must be made.

Was there in fact a

constitutional violation? Was the officer's decisions reviewable by others prior to
the constitutional violation? Does state (or local) law confer upon the officer the
authority to act as a policymaker for the municipality? If the answers are such that
an officer is a policymaker and the policy he or she makes on behalf of the
municipality leads to a deprivation of constitutional rights, then the Supreme Court
has held that the municipality must be liable.
inquiries differ, the outcomes will differ as well.

10

Thus, as the answers to these

III.

DEPUTY SUSAN MORGAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
FROM
MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION
AND
CONSPIRACY UNDER SECTION 1983.
Utah County Appellees state that Appellants do not offer any argument

concerning the dismissal of the conspiracy cause of action pursuant to Section
1983. Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 10. This is incorrect. The district court's
decision is silent on whether Appellants met the applicable test to establish a
conspiracy cause of action, and the district court ends its inquiry by finding that
Deputy Morgan enjoys qualified immunity from both malicious prosecution and
conspiracy pursuant to Section 1983. R. 205-209. Therefore, it must be concluded
that the district court felt that whether Appellants met the test for conspiracy was
irrelevant in light of Deputy Morgan's qualified immunity.

Appellants' brief

therefore responded to the district court's decision that Deputy Morgan had
qualified immunity for both malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy.
A.

The Facts Plead In The Complaint Clearly Show That Deputy
Morgan Is Not Entitled To Qualified Immunity.

Utah County Appellees do not dispute that the district court abused its
discretion in ignoring or misinterpreting facts presented in the Complaint and
further does not dispute that those discrepancies are material in determining
whether qualified immunity should be conferred upon Deputy Morgan. Instead,
Utah County Appellees once again misconstrue the facts plead by Appellants in
stating that Appellants "entire argument is based on the theory that the facts
11

alleged in the Complaint do not constitute probable cause for disorderly conduct.
. ." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 21. This is incorrect in two ways. First,
Appellants alleged in their Complaint, that even if the allegations against Mr.
Pintar were true, they did not constitute a crime.

R. 5, 829-30, 1292, 1294.

Second, Appellants base their argument on the totality of circumstances alleged in
the Complaint, including: (1) Deputy Morgan verbally threatened the Pintars with
criminal sanctions without probable cause or authority; (2) Deputy Morgan did not
even undertake a rudimentary investigation of the matter to determine if there was
any criminal act by Lewis J. Pintar; (3) Deputy Morgan did not have any contact
with Lewis J. Pintar before filing a police report which caused him to be arrested,
(4) a close relative of the complaining witnesses worked at the same law
enforcement agency as Officer Morgan, and (5) the underlying conduct as alleged,
even if true, does not constitute a crime. R. 3-6, 143; Apllnts.' Brief pp. 28.
Utah County Appellees argue that ". . . .the Pintars ignore the fact that the
district court never made a finding that the Pintars' facts did or did not constitute
disorderly conduct." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 21. In point of fact, the
district court ignored the allegation made by Appellants altogether.

It was

explicitly alleged as a matter of fact in the Complaint that the allegations against
Mr. Pintar, even if taken as true, did not constitute a crime under Utah law. The
district court had no latitude to make a finding regarding the allegation.

12

The

district court was compelled to accept the allegations of the Complaint as true.
Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Company, supra at 1219.
Furthermore, Utah County Appellees argue that the district court never ruled
on whether the facts constituted probable cause and instead focused on the "bigger
picture." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 21. The district court does not have this
discretion.

Whether or not the facts alleged in the Complaint show an arrest

without probable cause—a violation of a clearly established constitutional right—
goes directly to the heart of the matter.

The law is clear: where an official

deprives a constitutional right and that right was clearly established at the time of
deprivation such that a reasonable official would understand that his or her conduct
was unlawful, he or she does not enjoy qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194(2001).
Finally, Utah County Appellants allege that Deputy Morgan acted as a
reasonable officer. Utah County Appellees argue that "The Pintars. . . . [alleged]
Deputy Morgan failed to properly investigate the claims before turning over her
report to the Utah County Attorney's Office." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 23.
This is not true. As set forth, supra, Appellants alleged that there was absolutely
no investigation that took place. R. 4, 5, 818, 854, 862, 947-50, 956, 970, 980,
983, 985, 987, 992, 1135, 1292, 1294. "Failing to properly investigate" implies that
Officer Morgan attempted to investigate the matter, however negligently. Where
absolutely no investigation was undertaken by Deputy Morgan, it was clearly an
13

intentional decision. This is unreasonable. Utah County Appellees further argue
that "The Pintars allege in their Complaint that because the allegations leading to
Mr. Pintar9s arrest were false, Deputy Morgan's actions were unreasonable. This
is also not true. As set forth, supra, the Pintars alleged that even if the allegations
were true against Mr. Pintar, they did not constitute a crime R. 5, 829-30, 1292,
1294. Utah County Appellees' version of the allegations implies that Deputy
Morgan reasonably relied on the Houcks' allegations in arresting Mr. Pintar.
However, the Houcks' initial allegations do not support the conclusion that Deputy
Morgan acted reasonably in arresting L. Pintar. Simply put, the Houcks failed to
allege a crime. Would a reasonable officer arrest an individual for eating chocolate
ice cream? Or wearing a shirt with the wrong color? Just as these types of actions
constitute non-criminal activity, so do the allegations made by the Houcks that led
to the arrest of Mr. Pintar.
The other facts alleged in the Complaint further evince that Deputy
Morgan's actions were unreasonable: (1) the complaining witnesses' close relative
worked at the same sheriffs department, (2) Deputy Morgan knew of this fact
when she did not investigate this matter and arrested Mr. Pintar without the
allegation of a crime, and (3) Deputy Morgan chose not to contact Mr. Pintar at all
in this matter before having him arrested. R. 3-6. Apllnts.' Brief, pp. 25-26.

14

B.

The Actions Of The County Attorney(s) Do Not Confer Qualified
Immunity Upon Deputy Morgan Nor Do They Relieve Her Of
Liability.

Appellees, Martin and Darlene Houck argue that they are not responsible for
Deputy Morgan's decision to arrest Mr. Pintar and initiate criminal proceedings.
They merely made the complaint. R. 638-639, 1208, Houck Apllees.' Brief, pp.
34. Deputy Morgan argues that it is not her fault that the allegations made by the
Houcks later turned out to be false. R. 77-78, Utah County Apllees.5 Brief pp. 2324. Deputy Morgan merely relied on what the Houcks said. Deputy Morgan
further argues that she is not responsible for the County Attorney(s)' decision to
prosecute the matter after Mr. Pintar was arrested. She merely turned the matter
over to the County Attomey(s). Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 23-24.
Furthermore, Deputy Morgan argues that, since she is not responsible for the
actions of the County Attorney(s) in this matter, she is entitled to qualified
immunity. Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 23-24. While it is true that Deputy
Morgan is not responsible for the actions or inactions of the County Attomey(s)
during the criminal prosecution, the actions or inactions of the County Attorney(s)
are irrelevant. It was Deputy Morgan's decision, and hers alone, to arrest Mr.
Pintar and initiate the criminal proceedings. The subsequent actions taken by the
County Attorney(s) do not absolve Deputy Morgan of responsibility for her
actions.

15

The courts have used the common law of torts as a "starting point" for
determining the contours of constitutional violations under Section 1983. Pierce v.
Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004). The Restatement of Torts, 2d,
states that malicious prosecution occurs when one (a) initiates or procures the
proceedings without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than that of
bringing an offender to justice, and (b) the proceedings have terminated in favor of
the accused.

Restatement of Torts, 2d, §§653, 674 (1977). Pursuant to the

common law definition, simply initiating the criminal proceedings and having Mr.
Pintar arrested by itself subjects Deputy Morgan to liability under Section 1983.
This argument is buttressed by the fact that Deputy Morgan took these actions after
conducting absolutely no investigation, in the absence of the allegation of crime,
and with the knowledge that the complaining witnesses' close relative worked at
the same sheriffs department. Utah law is also clear that merely initiating or
instituting criminal proceedings and causing the arrest of an individual render one
liable for malicious prosecution where the other elements of the tort have been
met. Kool v. Lee, 134 P. 906, 910 (1913).
C.

The Facts As Plead In The Complaint Are Sufficient To Sustain A
Cause Of Action For Conspiracy Pursuant To Section 1983,

Although the subheading of Utah County Appellees' argument states that
Deputy Morgan is entitled to qualified immunity from conspiracy pursuant to
Section 1983, Utah County Appellees' argument instead addresses whether or not
16

Appellants met the elements of conspiracy pursuant to Section 1983 in the
allegations of their Complaint. Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 24-27. As set
forth supra, the district court did not address whether Appellants met the elements
of conspiracy pursuant to Section 1983.

For this reason, the elements of

conspiracy are not at issue here.
Even assuming the elements of conspiracy were at issue in this Appeal,
Appellants sufficiently plead those elements. Utah County Appellees argue that
Appellants present nothing more than conclusory allegations of conspiracy, which
is insufficient.

Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents, 159 F.3d 504 (10th Cir.

1998). In Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents, the court held that a law school
professor alleged a conspiracy against him by the faculty because the faculty
discussed action against him following allegations of his improper conduct with a
student.

The court held that the plaintiff provided only conclusory and

unsubstantiated allegations of a conspiracy based solely on the fact that the
governmental entities discussed the actions that were ultimately taken against
Plaintiff. Id. at 533. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of
Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents.
Utah County Appellees argue that the conspiracy allegation only concerns
Tonya Houck, the daughter-in-law of the complaining witnesses, Martin and
Darlene Houck, who is employed at the Utah County Sheriffs Department. Utah
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County Apllees.' Brief pp. 26.

Utah County Appellees further misstate

Appellants' allegations that the conspiracy is based solely on the following facts:
(1) Ms. [Tonya] Houck is employed as a secretary in the Judicial Services Division
of the Utah County Sheriffs Office; (2) Ms. [Tonya] Houck happens to be the
daughter-in-law of codefendants, Darlene and Martin Houck; and (3) Ms. Houck
has an alleged friendship with Deputy Morgan. Utah County Apllees.5 Brief pp.
26. Utah County Appellees further argue that even if these allegations were true,
they present nothing more than conclusory allegations of conspiracy which is
insufficient. Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 27.
However, the allegation that Tonya Houck and Deputy Morgan have a
personal and friendly relationship is not, nor ever has been, the lynchpin of
Appellants' cause of action for conspiracy. Appellants specifically plead in their
Complaint that: (1) the complaining witnesses, Martin and Darlene Houck, had a
close relative who worked at the same Utah County Sheriffs Office they called to
complain regarding L. Pintar; (2) the responding officer, Deputy Morgan, knew of
this fact when she responded to the call; (3) the Houcks and Deputy Morgan,
worked in concert to have L. Pintar arrested by:
(a)

Deputy Morgan verbally threatening criminal action against L. Pintar

to his wife when he was not present, despite the fact that he was not present at the
verbal altercation between Martin Houck and Nicholas Pintar the date of the
Complaint; R. 3-6, 808.
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(b)

Deputy Morgan failing to document in writing the fact that she went

to the Pintars' residence and verbally threatened criminal action against Mr. Pintar
to his wife. R. 3.
(c)

Deputy Morgan failing to conduct any investigation of the matter

before having L. Pintar arrested, booked, fingerprinted, and having his mug shot
placed on the internet; R. 4, 5, 818, 854, 862, 947-50, 956, 970, 980, 983, 985,
987,992,1135,1292,1294.
(d)

Deputy Morgan mandating L. Pintar's arrest even in the absence of an

allegation of a crime. R. 5, 829-30, 1292, 1294.
Most importantly, the allegations of the Complaint lead to the reasonable
conclusion that the above actions were done in concert as a result of an agreement,
either express or tacit, between Deputy Morgan, Martin Houck and Darlene
Houck. R. 5. Plaintiffs must only allege and show "facts tending to show an
agreement and concerted action." Beedles v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1073 (10th
Cir. 2005).

Although a conspiracy may be established by either direct or

circumstantial evidence, it is usually susceptible of no other proof than that of
circumstantial evidence because direct evidence of a conspiracy is ordinarily in the
possession and control of the alleged conspirators and is seldom attainable. 15A
Corpus Juris Secumdum, Conspiracy §37.
Utah County Appellees seem to be putting forth a requirement that a
conspiracy in this matter must include direct involvement of Tonya Houck.
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However, no such requirement exists. The allegations of the Complaint clearly
show an agreement and concerted action to deprive L. Pintar of his constitutional
right to be free from arrest without probable cause between Deputy Morgan,
Martin Houck and Darlene Houck.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
THE PINTARS LEAVE TO FILE THEIR SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT.
The Houck Appellees repeat, verbatim, their Opposition to Appellants'

original motion in district court as well as the district court's ruling. The Houck
Appellees do not address Appellants' argument that Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, is clear that "leave [to amend a complaint] shall be freely given
where justice so requires." The Houck Appellees do not address the fact that
Appellants relied upon and met the agreed upon deadline for the amending of
pleadings. Further, the Houck Appellees do not address to the fact that they had an
opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the allegations of the proposed Second
Amended Complaint and indeed propounded discovery questions which dealt
solely with those allegations, thus obviating any claim that they would be
prejudiced by the filing of the Second Amended Complaint.
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V.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PINTARS'
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AS TO
THE HOUCKS.
Rather than directly addressing Appellants' arguments regarding the First

Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief, the Houck Appellees simply repeat from
other briefs and rulings on file in this matter regarding the First Cause of Action
for Declaratory Relief.
VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PINTARS'
SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION FOR
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, CIVIL CONSPIRACY PURSUANT
TO SECTION 1983 AND CIVIL CONSPIRACY AS TO THE
HOUCKS.
The Houck Appellees again almost exclusively repeat from other briefs and

rulings on file in this matter regarding the Second, Third, and Fourth causes of
action for Malicious Prosecution, Civil Conspiracy, and Conspiracy Pursuant to
Section 1983, respectively. The Houcks do not present any new arguments or
authority.
VII.

CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully ask that in ruling on the district court's dismissal of

this matter, this Court bear in mind that an individual was arrested by the police
based on allegations by his neighbors where: (1) there was a history of great
hostility shown by the neighbors toward that individual; (2) the neighbor's close
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relative works at the same law enforcement agency as the arresting officer—a fact
which the officer knew; (3) there was absolutely no investigation of the matter by
the arresting officer; and (4) the allegations of the neighbor, even if true, did not
constitute a crime.
In order to uphold one or all of the district court's respective rulings, this
Court must determine whether such an arrest can happen without assigning any
responsibility to Utah County, Deputy Morgan, Martin Houck, and/or Darlene
Houck. Appellants respectfully submit that, based on the facts of this case and the
applicable law, it is impossible to do so and affirm the district court's rulings.
Based on the foregoing and those reasons set forth in Appellants' Brief,
Appellants respectfully request that this court reverse and remand the case to the
district court.
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DATED this2Qday of December, 2010
Law Offices of Jason L. Pintar,

o^ ,

J^^IAO^V

Jason L. Pintar,
Attorney for the Pintars
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